CaRMS at 50: Making the match for medical education by Turriff, Lisa et al.
Canadian Medical Education Journal 2020 
	Correspondence:	Lisa	Turriff;	email:	lturriff@carms.ca	 xx 
Canadian	Medical	Education	Journal	
Canadiana	
CaRMS	at	50:	Making	the	match	for	medical	education	
Les	50	ans	du	CaRMS:	jumelage	pour	l’éducation	médicale	
John Gallinger,1 Michel Ouellette,1 Eric Peters,2 Lisa Turriff1
 
1Canadian Resident Matching Service (CaRMS), Ontario, Canada 
2Paediatric Anesthesia, The Hospital for Sick Children, Ontario, Canada 
Published ahead of issue: April 22, 2020 
CMEJ 2020 Available at http://www.cmej.ca 
© 2020 Gallinger, Ouellette, Peters, Turriff; licensee Synergies Partners 
https://doi.org/10.36834/cmej.69786 This	is	an	Open	Journal	Systems	article	distributed	under	the	terms	of	the	Creative	Commons	Attribution	License	(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0)	which	permits	unrestricted	use,	distribution,	and	reproduction	in	any	medium,	provided	the	original	work	is	properly	cited
Abstract 
Entry into postgraduate medical training in Canada is facilitated through a national application and matching system 
which establishes matches between applicants and training programs based on each party’s stated preferences.  
Health human resource planning in Canada involves many factors, influences, and decisions. The complexity of the 
system is due, in part, to the fact that much of the decision making is dispersed among provincial, territorial, regional, 
and federal jurisdictions, making a collaborative national approach a challenge. The national postgraduate 
application and matching system is one of the few aspects of the health human resources continuum that is truly 
pan-Canadian. 
This article examines the evolution of the application and matching system over the past half century, the values 
that underpin it, and CaRMS' role in the process. 
___ 
Resumé 
L’entrée dans la formation médicale postdoctorale au Canada est facilitée par un système national de demande et 
de jumelage qui établit des correspondances entre les candidats et les programmes de formation en fonction des 
préférences déclarées par chaque partie. 
La planification des ressources humaines en santé au Canada implique de nombreux facteurs, influences et décisions. 
La complexité du système est due, en partie, au fait qu'une grande partie du processus décisionnel est réparti entre 
les compétences provinciales, territoriales, régionales et fédérales, ce qui rend difficile une approche nationale 
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collaborative. Le système national de demande postdoctorale et de jumelage est l'un des rares aspects du continuum 
des ressources humaines en santé qui est véritablement pancanadien. 
Cet article examine l'évolution du système d'application et de jumelage au cours du dernier demi-siècle, les valeurs 
qui le sous-tendent et le rôle du CaRMS dans le processus. 
 
Entry into postgraduate medical training in Canada is 
facilitated through a national application and 
matching system which establishes matches between 
applicants and training programs based on each 
party’s stated preferences. The Canadian system is 
similar to the process followed in the United States. 
The Canadian and American residency matches follow 
a central clearinghouse model featuring preferences 
expressed through rank order lists from both 
applicants and training programs.1 A match algorithm 
compares applicant and program rank order lists and 
matches applicants to programs based on both 
parties’ stated preferences.  
While the Canadian and American models are 
markedly similar, residency selection methods in 
other countries vary. Spain, France, and Portugal, for 
example, employ a national exam and base admission 
to residency exclusively on academic criteria,2 while 
in other European centres the process is handled 
locally by medical disciplines with applicants 
“admitted to the available spots based on an 
assessment of their skills, enthusiasm, and so on.”2  
Dr. Inge Schabort, International medical graduate 
coordinator at McMaster University’s Department of 
Family Medicine, observes:  
In my country of origin the usual practice would be to be 
approached by the Chair of a department to let you know 
you are one of the ‘chosen ones’ for a residency position 
- do you want to apply - and that is how I received my first 
residency position. It was only when I came to Canada 
and had to apply for a residency position again that I 
became aware of an independent organization that 
conducted the residency match at arm’s length with 
clear, transparent criteria specifying the ranking and 
matching processes. This was very different from my 
previous experience and my introduction to the Canadian 
culture of fairness and transparency.3  
Health human resource planning in Canada involves 
many factors, influences and decisions. The 
complexity of the system is due, in part, to the fact 
that much of the decision making is dispersed among 
provincial, territorial, regional and federal 
jurisdictions, making a collaborative national 
approach a challenge.4 One of the few aspects of the 
health human resources continuum that is truly pan-
Canadian is the national postgraduate application and 
matching system. 
A good match produces better outcomes both for 
physicians and the patients they serve. That’s why it’s 
so important to have a fair and objective match 
process that advances the interests of both medical 
learners and training programs. The Canadian 
Resident Matching Service (CaRMS) has been integral 
to this system’s evolution over the past 50 years and 
is working with all stakeholders to ensure it adapts 
successfully to the needs of tomorrow. 
Why the match? 
The Canadian match for postgraduate medical 
training was first established by the Canadian 
Association of Medical Students in 1969, in response 
to what was then a hectic, decentralized application 
and selection process.  
Offers came in piecemeal, on no predictable 
schedule, and applicants often had to consider one 
offer at a time without knowing their prospects at 
other programs. An applicant receiving their first 
offer from a second- or third-choice program had to 
decide whether to take that offer or decline it in 
hopes that another would arrive from their first 
choice; and if they gambled and lost, they could be 
left stranded. Because training programs were also 
scrambling to secure their desired candidates, time-
limited offers were common, heightening the anxiety 
for applicants. The decision-making process for offers 
and acceptances was not clear, and applicants would 
sometimes not feel safe to express their true 
preferences.5 Dr. Ian Bowmer, President of the Royal 
College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada and 
former faculty dean recalls his own experience during 
this time: “it was very opaque, inequitable and 
somewhat chaotic applying and getting a residency 
position when I went through it.”3 
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Many faculties also had frustrations with the pre-
match system, as they had to seek out applicants 
through informal channels earlier and earlier in order 
to secure their most desired candidates. And when a 
first-choice applicant rejected an offer, it was often 
too late for a program to secure its next preferred 
candidate. 
A national, coordinated match was seen by the 
medical students as one way to improve the process 
for everyone involved. But the students had 
challenges with both finances and securing the 
cooperation and participation of hospitals, who ran 
the training programs at the time. 
Why CaRMS? 
In 1970, key stakeholders in the medical education 
community – including the Association of Canadian 
Medical Colleges (ACMC) (now renamed as the 
Association of Faculties of Medicine of Canada – 
AFMC) representing the faculties, as well as physician 
associations, learner organizations and medical 
licencing and regulating authorities – banded 
together with the Canadian Association of Medical 
Students to help fully realize the idea of an open, fair 
and transparent match for postgraduate medical 
education.  
These stakeholders determined that a key ingredient 
to the success of the match, in addition to a broad 
base of community support, was a dedicated 
organization to oversee the process. This is when 
CaRMS’ earliest incarnation, the Canadian Intern 
Matching Service (CIMS), was created under the 
umbrella of the ACMC for the purpose of 
administering the match. 
It became evident in relatively short order that CIMS 
would be better able to perform its function as an 
impartial steward of the match if it were an 
independent organization. This led to the emergence 
of CIMS as an independent, not-for-profit entity in 
1982.6 According to Dr. Andrew Padmos, former CEO 
of the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of 
Canada and Canadian Association of Interns and 
Residents representative on the CIMS Advisory Board 
from 1974 to 1976: “Without a direct stake in 
individual outcomes, CIMS was uniquely suited to run 
a fair and unbiased residency application, selection 
and match process, and to be a platform where 
policies could be implemented provincially and 
nationally.”3 
The CaRMS of today is built on these strong 
foundations. Its governance model draws on a broad 
base of stakeholders in the medical education 
community to ensure the representation of all 
perspectives in its policies and procedures, while still 
maintaining its independence.7 
This independence remains a crucial aspect of 
CaRMS’ role in matching more than 4,000 medical 
students and residents to training positions each 
year. As Dr. Emily Stewart, President of Resident 
Doctors of Canada, notes, “an independent body 
administering the process is an integral part of the 
Match.”3 
The value of the match 
The match’s raison d'être is as compelling today as 
when it was first introduced. In the words of former 
CaRMS Executive Director Sandra Banner, “the 
policies governing the match were built around 
safety, fairness and equity, which remain core values 
today and have been strengthened by the system’s 
evolution over the years.”3 
Dr. Armand Aalamian, Postgraduate Dean at McGill, 
highlights transparency, clear rules and 
consequences for violating those rules as integral to 
an effective application, selection and match 
process.3 While compliance and accountability were 
uneven in the beginning—with programs occasionally 
offering positions outside of the established process, 
failing to adhere to common timelines and pressing 
for informal commitment from applicants—evolution 
over the years has brought a strong tradition of 
adherence to policies and processes. The CaRMS 
Violations Review Committee today provides crucial 
oversight and accountability, addressing the rare 
exceptions that arise. As former Canadian Federation 
of Medical Students (CFMS) president Dr. Henry 
Annan observes, “there is an inherent hierarchy 
between learners and faculty, and having an 
independent body overseeing the process helps 
ensure that it functions as intended and that those 
hierarchies do not result in conflicts of interest.”3 
The match recognizes the importance of choice for 
both applicants and programs, while ensuring 
medical schools can host the number, mix and 
distribution of positions that best allow them to meet 
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their social accountability mandate to the population 
as determined by provincial health human resources 
plans. Since the needs of the health care system 
dictate the opportunities available, applicants may 
need to consider a range of options—but no applicant 
will end up in a training program in which they do not 
want to train, and no program will receive a trainee it 
considers unacceptable. “Participants place their 
trust in the process,” says Fédération des médecins 
résidents du Québec president Dr. Christian 
Campagna, “because it makes it safe for them to 
pursue what they want without politics and 
geographic limitations.”3  
In fact, the Match Algorithm prioritizes applicants’ 
choices to give them the best chance of matching to 
their preferred programs. The algorithm traverses 
each applicant’s rank order list downwards, from 
most preferred program to least preferred, until the 
first program to which the applicant can be 
tentatively matched is reached, or until the 
applicant’s list of choices is exhausted. Each program 
accepts applicants upwards on its rank order list, 
continually removing less preferred tentative 
matches in favour of more preferred applicants, until 
the program is matched to the most preferred 
applicants who wish to be matched to the program. 
At the end of the process, each applicant has either 
been matched to their most preferred choice 
possible, or all choices submitted by the applicant 
have been exhausted and they have not been 
matched.8 “This prioritization of the student’s choice 
is an essential element of the way the match works,” 
says Dalhousie Family Medicine Department Head 
David Gass. “It puts them in the driver’s seat on their 
career path.”3 
How the application and selection system has 
evolved 
The CaRMS match of today, with its national scope, 
was a far-off vision when CIMS was created. In the 
match’s early days, not all programs chose to 
participate. The match’s national scope was a gradual 
achievement over many years as greater numbers of 
programs participated and higher proportions of 
positions were offered and filled through the match. 
It wasn’t until 2005, after several years of discussion, 
that Québec’s French-language medical schools 
joined to make the match a truly national institution. 
As the 2000s progressed, the community’s appetite 
for applying the benefits of the match beyond R-1 
resulted in the introduction of the three residency 
subspecialty matches CaRMS continues to offer 
today. 
One of the most transformational milestones in the 
evolution of the match was the introduction of a 
centralized and standardized application package and 
process in 1988. Developing a central application 
necessitated a great deal of deliberation about what 
information and documents would be included, as 
well as the processes surrounding it. Before the 
central application was introduced, there was a hard 
deadline for application submission, but not a hard 
start. Applicants could send applications to programs 
at different times, resulting in inequalities around the 
amount of time applications could be reviewed and 
allowing the possibility of first-come, first-served bias. 
The central application changed all of this, creating a 
level playing field by bringing in a match-wide 
schedule with common deadlines and standards. 
Other key changes along the way helped shape the 
match, and CaRMS, into its current form. In 1993, 
rotating internships following medical school were 
replaced with the current multi-discipline residency 
model.9 The move from rotating internships to thirty 
separate discipline-specific entry routes, which 
completely reimagined what medical training looked 
like, was the result of much discussion and debate. 
CaRMS, of course, adapted to serve this new direction 
in post-graduate training and then changed its name 
to the Canadian Resident Matching Service, or 
CaRMS, as it is known today. 1993 was also the first 
year the match was run in two iterations. The second 
iteration was introduced as an opportunity for 
unmatched graduates to consider and apply for 
positions that were not filled in the initial run of the 
match.  
The match process underwent another fundamental 
change in 2002 when CaRMS launched its online 
application process. This was made possible by 
CaRMS’ understanding of the need to keep pace with 
emerging technology to serve its clients, which led to 
investments in an in-house IT department to focus on 
the development of specialized enabling technology.  
Today, CaRMS’ online platform continues to evolve 
with changes in technology and community needs. 
Sharing information between applicants and 
programs for decision making purposes has taken on 
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sharper focus through recent enhancements to 
support Best Practices in Application and Selection 
(BPAS)10 with a focus on transparency and fairness.  
Since the match’s inception, there has been a 
burgeoning appetite for data around its outcomes. 
CIMS, and then CaRMS, has produced detailed match 
data reports for every match since its first in 1971.11 
As both community needs and technology have 
advanced, the nature of the data produced has grown 
in both quantity and quality—moving toward 
increasingly sophisticated analytics and data 
visualizations that can help stakeholders understand 
not only the outcomes but also the underlying factors 
and influences to aid in decision making. 
Some of this historical data can shed light on the way 
the match and its participants have changed. In the 
1971 match, the first administered by CaRMS, 578 
students participated (including 68 international 
medical graduates), vying for a total of 809 
positions.12 Fast forward to 2019 and the R-1 match 
includes 4,746 applicants (of which 1,725 were 
international medical graduates)13 and 3,346 
positions.14 
The charts below, which synthesize data from 
historical CaRMS match reports, tell the story of a 
system that has grown and evolved over time. Striking 
changes can be seen over the first 10 years as the 
system matured and stabilized. Impacts from the 
introduction of the second iteration and elimination 
of the rotating internship can be seen in match rates, 
unmatched CMG rates and fill rates.  (See Figures 1-
5). 
While international medical graduates have been a 
part of the match from the beginning, there has been 
significant growth in this cohort over the years. Since 
2008, more than 300 international graduates have 
entered residency training annually through the 
match. 
 
 
Figure 1 Matched applicants as part of the R-1 match 1971-2019 
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The most important measure of the match, of course, 
is its effectiveness. The two primary gauges of system 
efficacy—match rates and position fill rates—paint a 
picture of a system that is responsive to the basic 
inputs. Critical relationships can be seen between the 
number of positions and participants and the 
outcomes of applicant match rates and quota fill 
rates. As one might expect, generally speaking when 
the ratio of positions to participants is high, match 
rates are high and fill rates drop. The reverse is also 
true, as you can see in the longitudinal data in this 
article. 
There are of course many other influential factors. 
Two such factors which impact outcomes are policy 
changes concerning eligibility, and shifts in discipline 
supply and demand based on position availability and 
applicant preference. 
Figure 2 Current year CMG R-1 participation and 
quota 
 
Note: To ensure consistency of data over time, participant data 
includes current year CMG applicants only. 
Figure 3. Current year CMG R-1 participation and 
match rate 
 
Note: To ensure consistency of data over time, participant data 
includes current year CMG applicants only. 
 
 
Figure 4. R-1 quota and position fill rate 
 
Figure 5. Unmatched current year CMGs in the R-1 
match 
 
Looking toward the future 
The overall effectiveness of the match at the system 
level is clear. When looking at the match rates in 
Figure 3, the average yearly match rate for the past 
seven years is 97 per cent. This statistic is 
complemented by the fact that 99.4 percent of 
Canadian medical graduates match in Canada within 
three years.15  
Continuous improvement has always been a critical 
feature of the application, selection and match 
system. It needs to continue to evolve to keep pace 
with changing societal needs, and the emergence of 
new technology opens up new opportunities to 
rethink how things are done. As Postgraduate Dean at 
McGill Dr. Aalamian remarks, “the system cannot 
continue to be effective without ongoing evaluation 
and quality improvement of processes. It requires an 
ability to adapt based on feedback and the needs of 
stakeholders.”3 
Former CFMS president Dr. Annan notes that, 
“historically, the medical community has been slow to 
change, but perhaps the application, selection and 
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match system can actually be a catalyst for change.”3 
As steward of an important part of the system, CaRMS 
is working with stakeholders throughout the medical 
education sphere to address challenges as they arise 
and ensure the system continues working at its best 
for everyone. 
One of the most visible challenges the medical 
education community has been contending with in 
recent years is the issue of unmatched Canadian 
medical graduates. While there have always been 
Canadian graduates who do not match in their first 
year of participation as seen in the table above, there 
is no doubt that the prospect of being unmatched can 
add stress to applicants as they complete the 
application process—and going unmatched can be a 
very difficult outcome to deal with for the applicants 
affected. Accordingly, the situation has been the 
focus of a great deal of thought and action, including 
in the AFMC’s 2018 report “Reducing the number of 
unmatched Canadian Medical Graduates: A way 
forward” which points to the complexity of 
addressing the issue when “the primary stakeholders 
involved in, and impacted by, the increasing number 
of unmatched CMGs each have different priorities.”16 
Considering that applicants spend a great deal of time 
on their applications and on critical decisions, more 
information could help reduce the anxiety and 
uncertainty inherent in the process. Recent changes 
to program descriptions that incorporate Best 
Practices in Application and Selection (BPAS)10 are an 
example of efforts to better inform applicants. CaRMS 
will continue working with clients to explore 
solutions—technological and otherwise—to make 
the process and decision making easier and more 
effective.  
Congestion, to borrow a term used by Alvin E. Roth, 
co-winner of the 2012 Nobel Prize in Economic 
Science for his research into market design and game 
theory, is another challenge within the current 
system.17 A key feature of the Canadian system is the 
freedom for applicants to pursue every available 
opportunity; at the same time, increases in the 
number of applications each applicant submits are 
resulting in system congestion and administrative 
burden for many programs. Tools to help programs 
more easily manage their processes are routinely 
being developed and fine-tuned. 
In addition, other influences such as emerging 
technology, Competency Based Medical Education, 
the call for increased diversity in the medical 
education system, and the evolution of what are 
considered necessary skills, abilities and 
characteristics of physicians may impact the current 
system. In particular, the issue of supply and demand 
as manifested through the alignment – or lack thereof 
in some cases – between the provincial health human 
resources decisions that inform available positions 
and the discipline preferences of match applicants is 
an ongoing challenge.18 No doubt, these and other 
changes in the medical education continuum will 
impact the application, selection and matching 
system. Collectively, we will need to be nimble and 
respond appropriately and swiftly while at the same 
time ensuring we do not compromise a system that, 
in the last five decades, has matched more than 
80,000 learners to their next career opportunity. 
CaRMS remains committed to working with the 
medical education community to ensure the system 
evolves to meet their future needs—whatever that 
tomorrow may bring. 
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